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RECENT CASE NOTES
so that it might be shown that a subterfuge was intended. (The statutes
provide for a bona fide option. Burns 1929, 6867.2.) The value of the
proposed building was also omitted leaving it rather doubtful as to the
reasonableness of the so called rent and whether or not more than 6 per
cent was being charged. It might well be a bona fide contract of lease
rather than for purchase from the facts stated.
It seems to be the better view and the weight of authority that a school
district, being a municipal corporation, can make contracts for future pay-
ments upon the ground that until consideration has been furnished for
the contract to pay rent there is no indebtedness, rather than the theory
that the indebtedness is created at once and time of payment is postponed.
1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.), Sec. 196. Thus if the con-
tract in the present case could fairly be construed as a bona fide lease, at
a reasonable rental, there would be no objection to it on constitutional
grounds if the annual rent did not carry the indebtedness beyond the con-
stitutional limit. City of South Bend v. Reynolds, 155 Ind. 70, 57 N. E. 706.
R. R. D.
NEGLIGENCr--DUTY TO TREsPASSERs-DUTY TO WARN KNOWN TRES-
PASSER-The defendant, a nursery contractor, was on the land of Farris
removing a large elm tree. Several children observed the contractor's work
and were warned that they must stay away and were driven away by de-
fendant and his assistants several times. When the tree was about to fall,
the defendant cut the last root off and, without a warning, the tree fell upon
plaintiff, a child, who was severely injured. Plaintiff alleges negligence for
failure to warn that the tree was about to fall. The defendant defends say-
ing plaintiff was a trespasser and was contributorily negligent. Lower court
gave verdict for defendant on ground that plaintiff was a trespasser, but ad-
mitted defendant's negligence. Defendant released from damages on theory
that defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff because he was a trespasser.
Plaintiff appeals. Held, for plaintiff on grounds that defendant owed duty
to warn even a trespasser of any acts of defendant which would increase
his peril. Mourton v. Poulter (1930), 2 K. B. 183, 99 L. J. K. 289.
One who is upon the land of another by express or implied invitation to
do work which will benefit both the land owner and the party doing the
work is as a matter of law an invitee. Thistlewaite v. Heck, 75 Ind. App.
359, 128 N. E. 611; Bennett v. The R. R., 102 U. S. 577; 1 Thompson on
Negligence, 968 et seq. To the invitee the land owner owes a duty of
protection and he is in charge of the invitee's safety while .on the prem-
ises. Indiana, Bloomington and Western Railroad Co. v. Barnhart, 115
Ind. 393, 16 N. E. 121.
The invitee who is on the land of another by his express permission in
the form of an invitation and on which invitee is maintaining instrumen-
talities, owes no greater duty of due care to one upon the land, whether
rightfully or wrongfully, than the owner of the land. The one using the
land of X owes no more duty to a wrongdoer on the land than the owner
of the lot would owe so long as the users' use is rightful. Cumberland
Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. Martin, 116 Ky. 554, 76 S. W. 394. But
see Quinn v. Telephone Co., 72 N. J. Law 276, 62 A 412.
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In the principle case the facts as interpreted show that the infants were
trespassers upon the land of the owner and the nurseryman was an invitee
upon the land, which interpretation of the facts is logically correct, but
from these facts the court reaches a decision which at first appears to be
contrary to the American majority view of Cumberland Telegraph and
Telephone Co. v. Martin, supra.
One exception to the general rule that a land owner owes no duty to
keep his premises safe for trespassers is the "probable trespasser" and "in-
fant" rule. Wherever the land owner (or his invitee) has reason to believe
that trespassers are present or may be present, and wherever children fre-
quently trespass, or will be liable to trespass when land owner (or his
invitee) maintains something very dangerous in nature and in which case
the children will not realize the danger involved, the land owner (or his
invitee) owes a duty to use reasonable care and diligence to prevent any
bodily harm or injury to come to the trespassing infants. Restatement of
Law of Torts, Tentative Draft 4, Sections 203-209; Knapp v. Doll, 180 Ind.
526, 103 N. E. 385; Cleveland, C. C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Means, 59 Ind.
App. 383, 104 N. E. 785.
Then by analogy, and by authority also, an invitee upon the land of a
third party should be liable whenever an infant trespasser's presence could
be anticipated or is known or whenever a dangerous instrument or struc-
ture is maintained upon the land which would be injurious to infants and
of such a nature as to be accessible to them if they should trespass. God-
fery v. Kansas City Light and Power Co., 253 S. W. 233; O'Gare v. Phila-
delphia Electric Co., 244 Pa. 156, 90 A. 529.
A note in The Law Quarterly Review, v, 46, 393 states: "It is now
clear (since decision of Mourton v. Poulter) that whoever is about to do,
himself or by his servants, something involving risk of injury to persons
on the scene of action, and has reasonable grounds to expect that some one
may be there, is bound to give sufficient warning and, what is more, to
give it at the last decisive moment. Moreover, the parties respective inter-
ests, or want of interest, in the land on which the event happens are imma-
terial. The actor may be an occupying owner, a tenant, or a mere licensee.
The sufferer may be a licensee by acquiescence or a mere trespasser. This
doctrine has nothing to do with the duties of occupiers as such and does
not lend any countenance to the discredited position that a man is in some
manner bound to make his land safe for trespassers.
"The duty to warn a licensee or trespasser at the last moment possible
to avoid injury is the predominating end reached by these cases .... 
A similar duty is owed to children by one who maintains an attractive
nuisance, Lumbe rg v. City of Rock Island, 136 Ill. App. 495; although the
present case is to be understood as prescribing a duty not to increase the
risks to a probable or known trespasser while the attractive nuisance cases
go to the question of taking affirmative action to prevent injury to probable
trespassers. cf. Restatement, see. 206 with see. 209. J. B. E.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURIES ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT-
Kenneth Deckard was employed as a laborer by the trustees of Indiana
University to cut sod. While he was at work on June 19, 1928, a storm
arose; it begani to rain, and he sought shelter under a tree. Lightning
